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Popper’s program in the foundations of quan-tum mechanics defending objectivity and real-ism developed out of a profound dissatisfaction
with the point of view associated with Bohr, which
is usually designated the Copenhagen interpretation.
Here I will argue that while Popper’s aim is a noble
one, his program does not succeed on two counts: he
does not succeed in showing that Bohr’s philosophy
must be rejected as a variety of subjectivism, and his
alternative interpretation of indeterminacy rests on
a highly questionable assumption according to which
simultaneously precise conjugate parameters are pos-
sible. Nevertheless I like Popper’s propensity inter-
pretation of probability and think that the propensity
idea deserves further research.
Quanta 2012; 1: 33–57.
1 Introduction
For years I have been puzzled, by the attitudes of my col-
leagues in philosophy and physics toward Popper’s work
in the foundations of quantum mechanics. His program
developed out of a profound dissatisfaction with the point
of view associated with Bohr, which is usually designated
the Copenhagen interpretation. He has severely criticized
Bohr’s philosophy, calling it the “ruling dogma” [1, p.
7], and he presents his own interpretation of the quantum
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theory as an explicit alternative. And yet, with the ex-
ception of one essay by Paul Feyerabend [2, 3], no one
who professes sympathy with Bohr’s interpretation has
troubled to respond, in a systematic way, to Popper’s crit-
icism, nor have they undertaken a comprehensive critique
of Popper’s views. It may be that Bohr’s sympathizers
view Popper’s work as unworthy of a reply. But my guess
is that their reticence is to be explained not so much by
arrogance, as by a disheartening sense of their own failure
to have understood fully what Bohr intended. In any case,
the silence is embarrassing; a reckoning is in order.
Popper’s program in the foundations of quantum me-
chanics is continuous with his efforts elsewhere to defend
objectivity and realism. It is an essential part of his larger
philosophical enterprise because the apparent novelties
of the quantum theoretical description of nature have, on
occasion, been called upon to give scientific authority
to philosophical attacks on realism and objectivity. The
defense is two-pronged. It includes, on the one hand, a
critical analysis of the subjectivism which allegedly in-
fects the Copenhagen interpretation, and, on the other
hand, provision of objective interpretations of both inde-
terminacy and quantum mechanical probabilities. I will
argue that while Popper’s aim is a noble one, his program
does not succeed on two counts: he does not succeed in
showing that Bohr’s philosophy must be rejected as a va-
riety of subjectivism, and his alternative interpretation of
indeterminacy rests on a highly questionable assumption.
But I like his interpretation of probability, the propensity
interpretation. I think the propensity idea is Popper’s one
genuine contribution to the foundations of quantum me-
chanics, and its further development ought to be one of
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the principal aims of current research. But I also believe
that when the propensity interpretation is divorced from
the remainder of Popper’s program, it no longer looks
like an alternative to Bohr’s position; it appears, instead,
to confirm some of the latter’s basic insights.
2 Realism, objectivity and the
interpretation of quantum
mechanics
In 1927, Popper was finishing his Ph.D. at the University
of Vienna when two important ideas made their appear-
ance. The first was Heisenberg’s uncertainty or indetermi-
nacy principle [4]; the second was Bohr’s complementar-
ity interpretation of quantum mechanics [5–7]. The exact
meaning of each is to this day the subject of considerable
disagreement, but to a first degree of approximation they
can be characterized as follows.
From a formal point of view, the indeterminacy princi-
ple asserts the existence of an upper bound on the product
of the standard deviations of any two conjugate param-
eters of a physical system. In the familiar case of po-
sition and momentum, this limitation is expressed by
the well-known equation: ∆qx∆px ≥ ~2 , where ∆qx and
∆px represent, respectively, the indeterminacies of the
x-components of the position and momentum of a system.
But while the derivation of this equation and its ana-
logues for other pairs of conjugate coordinates is a fairly
straightforward matter (in the case of the energy-time
indeterminacy relation, even the derivation is a matter
of dispute; the basic difficulty concerns the possibility
of representing the time by a Hermitian operator) [8, pp.
136-156], their interpretation has been a topic of contro-
versy, various thinkers having argued (and this is by no
means an exhaustive catalogue of the different points of
view) that the indeterminacies represent (1) measures of
an intrinsic indefiniteness of the coordinates themselves,
(2) measures of the precision with which individual mea-
surements of the coordinates can be carried out, or (3)
measures of the spread of results obtained in a series of
measurements, each of which may, itself, be as precise as
desired.
Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics shares
with the indeterminacy principle a concern with the appar-
ently novel relationship between conjugate coordinates.
Bohr argues that the kinds of experimental arrangements
suited to the measurement of conjugate coordinates are
invariably mutually exclusive, in the sense that, for ex-
ample, a position measurement can never be performed
with exactly the same apparatus, nor even in the presence
of the same apparatus, which we use for a momentum
measurement [9, p. 699]. Since he also believes that,
in addition to their role in measurement, experimental
arrangements are somehow crucial in the very definition
of the properties of quantum objects (this is not merely a
variety of operationism; for Bohr the experimental con-
ditions are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for
definition) [9, p. 700], Bohr concludes:
Consequently, evidence obtained under differ-
ent experimental conditions cannot be compre-
hended within a single picture, but must be
regarded as complementary in the sense that
only the totality of the phenomena exhausts the
possible information about the objects. [10, p.
210]
Philosophers, and even many physicists, were quick
to attempt to extract philosophical lessons from quantum
mechanics. In the very lecture in which he introduced
complementarity, Bohr comments:
Now, the quantum postulate implies that any
observation of atomic phenomena will involve
an interaction with the agency of observation
not to be neglected. Accordingly, an indepen-
dent reality in the ordinary physical sense can
neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the
agencies of observation. [7, p. 54]
Reading this and many similar pronouncements, Popper
thought he detected a common theme, which he took to
be characteristic of the views thought to be shared by
Bohr and his associates at Copenhagen:
. . . the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
mechanics . . . says that “objective reality has
evaporated” and that quantum mechanics does
not represent particles, but rather our knowl-
edge, our observations, or our consciousness,
of particles. [1, p. 7]
Later I will question the assumption that there is a single
Copenhagen interpretation, for there are important differ-
ences between Bohr and even his close colleagues, like
Heisenberg. But the contrary impression is widespread,
so it is not surprising that Popper adopts it uncritically
(Heisenberg, himself, is largely responsible for the con-
fusion [11]. He freely uses the label Copenhagen inter-
pretation to denote both his views and Bohrs [12]). In
any case, the threat which such a viewpoint poses to Pop-
per’s realism is substantial, for it suggests that realism is
contradicted by a physical theory with impeccable em-
pirical credentials. Moreover, a number of thinkers who
allied themselves with the Vienna positivists were quick
to draw just such a conclusion. The confluence of both
philosophical and scientific doubts about the existence of
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a real external world surely made the case against realism
look formidable.
Popper’s arguments against positivism are familiar
enough not to need repeating here. But his arguments
against drawing idealist or subjectivist conclusions on the
basis of quantum mechanics are far less well known, in
spite of the importance which Popper himself attaches to
them.
According to Popper, realism and objectivity are not
contradicted by the formulae of quantum mechanics, the
correctness by of which he does not question, but only
by a mistaken interpretation of these formulae [13, §75].
And the primary reason for this mistaken interpretation,
so he claims, is a failure to understand correctly the nature
of quantum mechanical probability statements [14, p. 73]
[1, p. 28]:
. . . the problems of the interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics can all be traced to problems
of the interpretation of the calculus of probabil-
ity. [15, p. 104]
The quantum mechanical formalism describes a phys-
ical system by means of a mathematical device called a
state function (commonly referred to as the ψ function),
a different state function being assigned to the system
for every different state that it can occupy (hence one
typically speaks indifferently of states and state func-
tions). Various purely mathematical manipulations of the
state function enable one to derive predictions concerning
the outcome of measurements that can be performed on
the system. The Heisenberg indeterminacy formulae are
themselves the result of such manipulations. The fact
that the ψ function arises as a solution of the Schro¨dinger
equation (the fundamental dynamical equation of quan-
tum mechanics), which bears a formal analogy to the
classical wave equation, led Schro¨dinger and other non-
Copenhagen quantum theorists to believe that electrons
and other elementary particles in some sense really are
waves [8, pp. 24-33] [16] [17, pp. 43-80]. But ever
since Born’s pioneering statistical interpretation of the ψ
function, there has been widespread agreement that the
ψ function is best viewed as providing a measure of the
probability of a system’s being found, upon measurement,
to have a specific value of a given variable [18] [8, pp.
38-44].
While agreeing that quantum mechanics is a proba-
bilistic theory, Popper at first denied that this fact alone
proves that nature itself is not deterministic. In the 1930s
he argued that the determinism issue was essentially a
metaphysical question, and hence not scientific, but he
betrayed a certain sympathy for determinism, at least in
the form of a heuristic maxim to the effect that scien-
tists should always search for strict laws [13, §78]. Later,
however, he came to regard the determinism thesis as a
testable hypothesis, and expressed his preference for a
type of objective indeterminism [19, 20]. In this respect,
Popper stands alone among the realist critics of Bohr and
Heisenberg, many of whom, including Einstein have held
the opinion that realism and determinism go hand in hand.
In a letter to Born, Einstein says:
I admit, of course, that there is a considerable
amount of validity in the statistical approach
. . . I cannot seriously believe in it, because the
theory cannot be reconciled with the idea that
physics should represent a reality in time and
space, free from spooky actions at a distance.
[21, p. 158]
Instead of focusing on the determinism issue, Popper’s
dispute with Bohr and Heisenberg concerns the meaning
of the probability statements which quantum mechanics
necessarily employs. In Popper’s account, the Copen-
hagen view traces the need for probabilities to quantum
mechanical limitations on our knowledge of the properties
of atomic systems, and thus ascribes a subjective inter-
pretation to quantum mechanical probabilities. Popper,
on the other hand, traces the probabilistic character of
quantum mechanics to the statistical character of its prob-
lems, and would thus give an objective interpretation to
its probability statements. In the 1930s this meant for
him a classical frequency interpretation, later it meant
a propensity interpretation. What exactly is meant by
the various kinds of interpretations will be considered in
some detail below.
The distinction between objective and subjective inter-
pretations is crucial, for Popper holds that all of the objec-
tionable consequences of the Copenhagen interpretation,
including its denial of realism, stem from its predilection
for a subjective interpretation of probability statements.
In his own words:
. . . it is this mistaken belief that we have to ex-
plain the probabilistic character of quantum the-
ory by our (allegedly necessary) lack of knowl-
edge, rather than by the statistical character of
our problems, which has led to the intrusion
of the observer, or the subject into quantum
theory. [1, p. 17]
If this is the source of the problem, then to defend realism
and objectivity from the quantum mechanical challenge,
one need only establish the tenability of an objective
interpretation of quantum me chanical probabilities. This
is precisely Popper’s strategy.
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3 Indeterminacy and subjectivism
The topic of Popper’s first disagreement with the Copen-
hagen theorists was the interpretation of the Heisenberg
indeterminacy formulae; it was here that Popper thought
he detected most clearly the Copenhagen penchant for
subjectivism. But while indeterminacy was the immedi-
ate focus of Popper’s initial critique, the implications of
that critique were widespread, touching already upon the
central problem of the meaning of the quantum mechan-
ical state function. Since the supposed need to combat
the malaise of subjectivism is what gives meaning and
purpose to Popper’s whole program in the philosophy of
quantum mechanics, we would do well to examine this
part of his argument in considerable detail.
From the start, the discussion of indeterminacy, even
among those identified as the members of the Copenhagen
school, was characterized by a tension between at least
two different interpretations. In some cases one even
finds a vacillation between the two in the work of an
individual physicist. The first takes indeterminacy to be
merely a limitation on measurement, while the second
takes it to be a reflection of some intrinsic indefiniteness
of the coordinates of atomic systems. Both views entail
a limitation on how precisely we can know a system’s
coordinates.
Heisenberg, himself, tended toward the former interpre-
tation, though he was by no means wholly consistent in
his published pronouncements on the subject. Typically,
he illustrated the indeterminacy relations with thought ex-
periments which purport to show how a measurement of
an electron’s position, following close up on a momentum
measurement, would necessarily interfere with or disturb
the electron’s momentum in an inherently unpredictable
manner, so that the prior momentum measurement would
be rendered useless for the purposes of prediction [22, pp.
21-30]. This means that the physical disturbance caused
by the position measurement necessarily renders impre-
cise our previously obtained knowledge of the electron’s
momentum, and, because it thus focuses our attention on
limitations on knowledge, Poper labels this reading of
indeterminacy subjective [13, p. 215].
Following the lead of Schro¨dinger’s wave mechanics,
a number of other physicists opted for the intrinsic indef-
initeness interpretation of indeterminacy. According to
this view, the Heisenberg formulae imply that it is phys-
ically impossible for a system like an electron even to
possess simultaneously definite values of any two conju-
gate variables The unavoidable imprecision in our knowl-
edge of the value of these coordinates is thus explained
as the reflection of a deeper-lying indefiniteness of the
coordinates themselves. Because it regards indeterminacy
as a property of the system itself, and not directly as a
function of our limited knowledge of what might actually
be a well-defined system, Popper terms this approach
objective [13, p. 215].
At the time he published Logik der Forschung (1935),
Popper had had no formal advanced training in physics –
he says of his abilities in this area: “I felt in the end that
I was not really good enough” [15, p. 57] and yet he al-
ready sensed the physicists’ confusion over indeterminacy
more clearly than did many physicists themselves. In an
interesting analysis, Popper traces the vacillation between
the subjective and objective approaches to indeterminacy
to the physicists’ desire to reconcile what, at the time,
Popper took to be ultimately inconsistent features of the
quantum theory as it was then understood [13, pp. 210-
211]. On the one hand, the apparent success of quantum
mechanics in explaining such fundamental phenomena
as the stimulated emission of radiation from atoms, the
photoelectric effect, and the specific heats of solids (all
of which were embarrassing problems for classical theo-
ries of radiation and matter), together with the resolution
of doubts about the strict conservation of energy in indi-
vidual atomic processes, encouraged physicists to view
quantum mechanics as a fundamental theory of the me-
chanics of individual systems. Such a view also accorded
with a traditional conception of physics as the basic sci-
ence of nature, the science which concerns itself with
the deepest level of structure. According to Popper, it
was this attitude which initially inclined physicists toward
the objective approach. At the same time, however, the
emerging consensus, especially among those termed the
Copenhagen theorists, was that quantum mechanics is
an irreducibly probabilistic theory, and this belief had
just received impressive reinforcement at the time Logik
der Forschung was being written, in the form of von Neu-
mann’s famous, though, as we now know, mistaken, proof
of the impossibility of deterministic, hidden variable inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics [23, pp. 313-325] [24].
The problem, Popper suggests, was in understanding how
quantum mechanics could be both a theory of individual
systems and a probabilistic theory. In Popper’s account,
it was the physicists’ striving to resolve this difficulty that
led them down the garden path to subjectivism.
On the face of it, there is no difficulty; the objective
approach to indeterminacy seems to hold the key. One
could simply argue that theory’s probabilistic character
stemmed from an intrinsic indefiniteness in the states of
individual systems, or, more specifically, from an indefi-
niteness in some or all of the parameters, such as position
and momentum, which go to make up the state; the un-
certainties mentioned in the Heisenberg formulae would
be the measures of this indefiniteness. Under these cir-
cumstances, probabilistic predictions would be the norm,
for if, say, the position of a system is intrinsically indef-
Quanta | DOI: 10.12743/quanta.v1i1.9 November 2012 | Volume 1 | Issue 1 | Page 36
inite at a given time, then no matter how deterministic
the theory’s dynamical laws are, they can at best yield
only a range of possible positions for the system at any
subsequent time. But however attractive this analysis
might initially appear, certain considerations raise serious
doubts about its cogency, doubts which go far beyond
the mere offense to our classical intuitions, according to
which indeterminacy is always but an appearance, mask-
ing a still deeper deterministic reality.
From a physical point of view, the most vexing dif-
ficulty concerns the famous problem of the collapse or
reduction of the wave packet [13, pp. 231-232] [1, pp.
34-38]. If we are to regard indefiniteness as an intrinsic
property of an individual system, then we must regard the
state function as a description of the intrinsic state of that
system (as opposed to regarding it as a representation of
our knowledge of the system). In the most general case,
which is typical of a system prior to the performance
of a measurement on it, the state function is of a type
known as a superposition, a weighted, complex sum of
a number of different state functions, each of which, by
itself, corresponds to a state wherein the system has a
definite value of the observable to be measured. At the
very least, a system described by a superposition cannot
be known, with certainty, to be in any one of the compo-
nent states, called the eigenstates of the observable; but
one can calculate the probability of the system’s being
found, upon measurement, to have any specific value of
the observable. Repeated measurements on identically
prepared systems will yield different results, but the dis-
tribution of those results will conform to the predicted
probabilities. Whether the system can be said actually
to be in one of the eigenstates prior to the measurement
is an important question of interpretation. (It is the pres-
ence of superpositions in the formalism that gives rise
to non-zero indeterminacies. The indeterminacy princi-
ple’s restriction on conjugate parameters is related to the
formalism’s not admitting simultaneous eigenstates of
conjugate observables. If a system is in an eigenstate of
one observable, it will be in a superposition with respect
to any conjugate observable.)
Being committed to the view that the state function
describes the state of the system itself, the proponents
of intrinsic indefiniteness must conceive of the state cor-
responding to a superposition as somehow “blurred” or
“smeared”. They would have to deny that a system thus
described is in any definite eigenstate, be it known or un-
known. The problem with this view is that measurement
always yields a definite result, and if the measurement
is a non-destructive one (for example, a filter that only
allows systems with a definite value of the observable to
pass), then immediately after the measurement a system
is always describable by a state function corresponding to
one of the eigenstates represented in the original superpo-
sition. Such a description of the post-measurement state
of the system is correct, in the sense that it leads to the
proper predictions of the system’s subsequent behavior.
It would appear then, from the objective point of view,
as though a system originally in a “smeared”, indefinite
state collapses upon measurement to some definite state.
But – and this is why the collapse is a problem – quan-
tum mechanics has no way of explaining the collapse. If
the state function is taken to describe a system’s intrinsic
properties, then it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the
collapse is a real physical phenomenon, but the dynam-
ics of the quantum theory make no provision for such a
quasi-instantaneous, discontinuous transition; certainly
the Schro¨dinger equation, the basic dynamical equation
of quantum mechanics, cannot account for such a process.
The best the proponents of the objective approach can do
in the face of this difficulty is to fo1low von Neumann
in taking the collapse as an independent postulate (the
so-called projection postulate) [23, pp. 347-358] [8, pp.
226-230]. This strategy is not objectionable from an
empirical point of view, but the ad hoc character of the
postulate makes its presence an aesthetic defect in an
otherwise elegant theory.
Popper was neither the first nor the only commentator
to draw attention to the troubling implications of the prob-
lem of wave packet collapse. But over the years he voiced
other criticisms of the idea that a superposition describes
the intrinsic state of an individual system. One of the most
important is his contention that from the point of view of
the objective indefiniteness interpretation, the quantum
formalism contains metaphysical elements [13, p. 215].
The details of the pertinent arguments will be reviewed
and criticized in section 4, but briefly, what Popper main-
tains is that while precise predictions of all aspects of the
future behavior of quantum systems may be impossible,
completely precise calculations of all aspects of the past
behavior of quantum systems are possible according to
the formalism. If, as the objective indefiniteness interpre-
tation asserts, quantum systems never posses simultane-
ously precise values of all coordinates, then the results of
these calculations are, to say the least, anomalous.
Among the alternatives open to those who are dissat-
isfied with the objective indefiniteness interpretation of
the state function and the Heisenberg formulae, two are
prominent in Popper’s deliberations. The one favored by
Popper continues to regard quantum mechanics as a prob-
abilistic theory, but denies that it is itself a fundamental
theory of individual systems, viewing the state function
instead as a description of the statistical properties of
an ensemble of systems, and the Heisenberg formulae
as what Popper calls statistical scatter relations. This
view assumes that individual systems do always possess
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simultaneously definite values of all their coordinates, an
ensemble of systems displaying the appropriate scatter in
these values. The other alternative is to continue to regard
quantum mechanics as a probabilistic theory of individual
systems, but to construe the state function as describing
not the intrinsic physical properties of microsystems, but,
in some way, our knowledge of these properties. This
view is of a piece with the limitations-on-measurement
interpretation of indeterminacy, if the latter is construed,
following Popper, as a statement about limitations on the
possible extent of our knowledge of atomic systems; and
like the limitations-on-measurement idea, it earns from
Popper the designation subjective [13, p. 215]. However,
to avoid begging any questions, I will refer to it as the
epistemic interpretation of the state function.
This interpretation has its advantages. For instance,
to say that a superposition correctly describes a system
is merely to say, on this approach, that our knowledge
of the system is limited in such a way that we know
only the likelihood of one of its variables being found to
have a certain value; no claim about the intrinsic state
of the system is entailed, and the resulting difficulties
of the objective interpretation are avoided. In particular,
the collapse of the state function is regarded, from this
perspective, simply as a sudden, discontinuous change in
the degree of precision of our knowledge of the system,
something which is not at all surprising, given that the
aim of measurement is to enhance our knowledge of the
object of measurement. Another advantage is that the
epistemic interpretation enables us to continue regarding
quantum mechanics as a theory of individual systems,
at least in the sense that the knowledge which it takes
as fundamental can be viewed as knowledge, however
imprecise, of individual systems.
Problems such as the collapse of the wave packet were
a common topic of discussion among the early develop-
ers of the quantum theory, and undoubtedly were crucial
in leading some to favor the epistemic interpretation of
the state function. A general sympathy with positivist
scruples regarding talk of unobservable entities should
also not be discounted as an influence on their thinking.
But Popper has suggested that the situation in the foun-
dations of probability was among the most important fac-
tors favoring this choice. He notes that in the late 1920s
and early 1930s, crucial years in the development of the
Copenhagen interpretation, the only objective theory of
probability under serious discussion was the relative fre-
quency interpretation, which defines the probability of
one kind of event, called an outcome, as its frequency,
relative to other outcomes, in an infinite sequence of other
events, called trials. According to Popper, this definition
presents a problem for those who attempt to construe
indeterminacy and quantum mechanical probabilities gen-
erally as objective properties of individual quantum sys-
tems. The difficulty is that, as it stands, the frequency
theory does not permit the unambiguous ascription of
probabilities to individual events, such as getting a six
on a specific throw of a die; one could, in principle, have
different probabilities for that event, depending on which
infinite sequence of trials it is included in. But this means
that the attribution of an objective probability, in the rel-
ative frequency sense, to a specific event is meaningful
only relative to a specification of an infinite sequence of
trials, which is really to say that such a probability is a
property not of the individual event, but of the infinite
sequence itself. Since the interpretation of quantum me-
chanics as a fundamental theory of individual systems
seems to require the attribution of probabilities to indi-
vidual events (such as the passage of a specific photon
through a filter), these probabilities cannot, therefore, be
understood as relative frequencies. And if the relative fre-
quency interpretation is the only objective interpretation
of probability, it follows that individual quantum mechan-
ical probabilities are not objective [13, §71] [15, §34].
In the period under discussion, the principal alternative
to the frequency interpretation was one which derives
the probability function from a measure of a person’s
degree of confidence in the truth of a proposition. This is
commonly referred to as the subjective interpretation of
probability. It poses no obstacle to our regarding proba-
bilities as properties of individual events and systems, as
long as it is understood that the connection with individual
events is indirect, in the sense that probabilities, subjec-
tively construed, are, strictly speaking, measures of one’s
faith in the truth of propositions describing the events,
and only secondarily properties of the events and systems
themselves. In particular, subjective probabilities are not
infected with the same kind of ambiguity which plagues
probabilities regarded as relative frequencies; different
individuals might assign different probabilities to one and
the same proposition (this is, of course, a large part of
what is meant by calling such probabilities subjective, and
a major reason why Popper opposes this interpretation),
but there is no systematic obstacle to any one individual’s
assigning a unique probability to a proposition describing
a single event. (For Popper’s objections to the subjec-
tive interpretation of probability, see [25] [13, §48 and
§62]). It is precisely because the subjective interpretation
gives us a way to speak of probabilities as properties of
individual events and systems that Popper identifies it
as the primary motivation for many physicists’ having
interpreted quantum mechanical probabilities, and thus
the state function, in an epistemic, or, in Popper’s words,
subjective, fashion. He says:
Now frequency theorists hold that there are ob-
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jective questions concerning mass phenomena,
and corresponding objective answers. But they
have to admit that whenever we speak of the
probability of a single event, qua element of
a mass phenomenon, the objectivity becomes
problematic; so that it may well be asserted
that with respect to single events, such as the
emission of one photon, probabilities merely
evaluate our ignorance. For the objective proba-
bility tells us only what happens on the average
if this sort of event is repeated many times:
about the single, event itself the objective sta-
tistical probability says nothing. It was here
that subjectivism entered quantum mechanics
. . . [15, p. 178]
Popper marshals evidence, in the form of quotations from
a variety of authors, in order to convince us that, from the
time of the consolidation of the modern quantum theory
in the late 1920s,
physics had become a stronghold of subjectivist
philosophy, and it has remained so ever since.
[15, p. 177]
We read from Moritz Schlick, one of the fathers of Vienna
positivism:
Of natural events themselves it is impossible to
assert meaningfully any such things as “hazi-
ness” or “inaccuracy”. It is only to our own
thoughts that anything of this sort can apply. . .
[13, pp. 215-216] [26]
Sir James Jeans is found commending a similar view:
In brief, the particle picture tells us that our
knowledge of an electron is indeterminate; the
wave picture that the electron itself is indeter-
minate, . . . Yet the content of the uncertainty
principle must be exactly the same in the two
cases. There is only one way of making it so:
we must suppose that the wave picture [the ψ
function is intended here] provides a represen-
tation not of objective nature, but only of our
knowledge of nature . . . [13, p. 229] [27, p.
235]
Popper comments on the preceding quotation:
Schro¨dinger’s waves are thus for Jeans subjec-
tive probability waves, waves of our knowledge.
And with this, the whole subjectivist probabil-
ity theory invades the realm of physics. [13, p.
229]
The list of citations could easily be extended; there is
no denying that quantum mechanics has frequently been
construed as referring to our knowledge, rather than to the
world, especially by thinkers either belonging to or influ-
enced by the tradition of Vienna positivism. To give just
one more example, consider the following more recent
remark by Heisenberg:
The conception of the objective reality of the
elementary particles has thus evaporated in a
curious way, not into the fog of some new, ob-
scure, or not yet understood reality concept, but
into the transparent clarity of a mathematics
that represents no longer the behavior of the
elementary particles but rather our knowledge
of this behavior. [28, p. 100]
But Popper wants to claim much more than this. He wants
to claim, first, that the dominant interpretive tradition
since the 1930s – such is the stature, in his estimation, of
the Copenhagen interpretation – is subjectivistic in import
and intent, second, that the allegedly subjectivistic Copen-
hagen interpretation is the result of a mistaken subjective
interpretation of quantum mechanical probabilities; and
third, that this “intrusion of the subject” into quantum
theory leads the Copenhagen theorists to conclude that
“objective reality has evaporated”. About each of these
claims serious questions must be raised. In particular,
as I mentioned earlier, I want to criticize the assumption
that the opinions of Bohr and Heisenberg coalesce into a
single interpretation. A subjectivist epidemic may have
raged in Copenhagen, but some people might not have
succumbed.
First we must pause to consider carefully what Popper
means when he labels a point of view subjective. That
an unflattering contrast with objective is intended is clear.
He remarks, for example:
. . . if one interprets the Heisenberg formulae
(directly) in a subjective sense, then the position
of physics as an objective science is imperilled.
[13, p. 229]
But the meaning of subjective is not exhausted by this
contrast. We have found that what earns an interpreta-
tion the designation subjective from Popper is its being
somehow concerned with our knowledge of physical sys-
tems, rather than with the systems themselves. But if
subjective interpretations of quantum mechanics are to
be opposed because they represent a threat to objectivity,
there is something puzzling about simply making refer-
ence to knowledge the criterion of subjectivity, for as
Popper himself has stressed in other contexts, there are
both subjective and objective types of knowledge:
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Now I wish to distinguish between two kinds
of ’knowledge’: subjective knowledge (which
should better be called organismic knowledge,
since it consists of the dispositions of organ-
isms); and objective knowledge, or knowledge
in the objective sense which consists of the logi-
cal content of our theories, conjectures, guesses
. . . [29, p. 73]
In terms of Popper’s later “three worlds” ontology, sub-
jective knowledge is knowledge in its World 2 aspect,
where World 2 is “the mental world, or world of mental
states” [29, p. 154] (in Popper’s philosophy, there is no
inconsistency in regarding subjective knowledge as both a
mental state and a disposition of an organism. He rejects
a Cartesian dualism of mental and physical substances,
but advocates a dualism of mental and physical states.
A mental state is, thus, for Popper, just a special kind
of dispositional state of an organism [29, p. 231]), and
objective knowledge is knowledge in its World 3 aspect,
this world being characterized as:
. . . the world of intelligibles, or of ideas in
the objective sense; it is the world of possi-
ble objects of thought: the world of theories in
themselves, and their logical relations; of argu-
ments in themselves; and of problem situations
in themselves. [29, p. 154]
It is the existence of just this ambiguity in our talk of
knowledge which led me to speak above of epistemic in-
terpretations, rather than subjective ones, the point being
that talk of knowledge may not be, automatically, a sign
of subjectivism.
In view of the prominent role which Popper assigns to
the objective/subjective knowledge distinction, one would
assume that when he indicts an interpretation as subjec-
tivist because it makes essential reference to knowledge,
he means to indict it for referring to knowledge in the
subjective sense, but while his bill of particulars usually
includes the expression subjective knowledge or one of
its cognates [29, p. 141], he does not always specify
the nature of the crime this carefully. Popper no doubt
wants to criticize reference to either kind of knowledge
in any interpretation of a physical theory which makes
our knowledge, rather than the world, the focus of the
theory’s attention, for the claim that theories tell us about
our knowledge, rather than the world, does not harmonize
with a realist attitude. Moreover, one of the traditional
(though, I would argue, misleading) uses of the terms
subjective and objective is precisely to mark the knowl-
edge/world distinction. So while it may be confusing,
the distinction between subjective and objective knowl-
edge might simply be irrelevant to Popper’s discussion of
epistemic interpretations of quantum mechanics.
But I do not think that this is the case. Popper was
too systematic a philosopher not to have noted such a
confusion and sought to correct it. My suggestion is that
he believed that subjectivism is the same sin, wherever
it might be encountered, and, thus, that the subjective
character of an interpretation of quantum mechanics con-
sists in nothing more and nothing less than its taking the
theory to tell us about our subjective knowledge of events,
knowledge in the World 2 sense, rather than the events
themselves. In a later essay he said:
. . .it is not surprising that neglect of the third
world – and consequently a subjectivist epis-
temology – should be still widespread in con-
temporary thought. Even where there is no
connection with Brouwerian mathematics there
are often subjectivist tendencies to be found
within the various specialisms, I will here refer
to some such tendencies in logic, probability
theory, and physical science. [29, p. 140]
The story which he then sketches about subjectivism in
probability theory and physics is the same one we have
been reviewing in this section. It is only in his early dis-
cussion of subjectivism in quantum mechanics, in The
Logic of Scientific Discovery, that Popper fails to heed the
distinction between subjective and objective knowledge,
but in that discussion the same work is performed by a
distinction which prefigures the later one, namely, a dis-
tinction between “our knowledge” simpliciter and “objec-
tive science”, the former being defined, just as subjective
knowledge is later defined, as a “system of dispositions”.
And about “knowledge”, thus defined, Popper adds:
But all this interests only the psychologist. It
does not even touch upon problems like those
of the logical connections between scientific
statements, which alone interest the epistemol-
ogist. [13, p. 80]
Thus, whether Popper speaks just of “knowledge”, in his
early work, or more pointedly of subjective knowledge, in
his later work, his charging an interpretation with subjec-
tivism means simply that it reads quantum mechanics as
telling us about a kind of knowledge which is the private
possession of individual knowing subjects, rather than
about the physical world.
There is a good reason for being careful to show that
what motivates Popper’s charge of subjectivism is a worry
about reference to knowledge of the specifically subjec-
tive type. For this criticism, directed against Bohr, Heisen-
berg and the other Copenhagen theorists, is a crucial part
of Popper’s argument; it is what first establishes the need
for an alternative, objective interpretation of quantum me-
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chanics, which Popper then provides. But I want to argue
that the charge, thus understood, is unfounded.
As noted above, it is easy to accumulate a list of ref-
erences to knowledge in the writings of commentators
on quantum mechanics who are loosely associated with
Bohr. Some of them, surely, can plausibly be read as
references to subjective knowledge (Schlick’s mention of
“our own thoughts” is an example), but many, if not most,
cannot (I would be reluctant to read Jeans talk of “our
knowledge of nature” in this way). The fact is that many,
often ill-considered things have been said about quantum
mechanics by philosophers and, especially, by physicists.
And it is pointless to press these remarks too hard with
fine, philosophical distinctions. I would guess that if we
explained the subjective/objective knowledge distinction
to Jeans, he would say that, of course, he meant knowl-
edge of the objective sort, but it is in the nature of the
case that such conjectures cannot easily be established.
It is a far better strategy for critic and defender simply
and straight-forwardly to consider the facts. Thus, we
must address the question as to whether or not there is
anything about the quantum, theory that would lead some-
one to assign subjective knowledge a special place in its
interpretation.
The hallmark of objective knowledge, according to
Popper, is its susceptibility to inter-subjective testing and
criticism [13, p. 25]. Is there any reason to suspect
that our knowledge of quantum objects and events falls
short of this standard? The original source of the worry
over subjectivism in quantum mechanics is doubtless
Heisenberg’s unfortunate explanation of indeterminacy as
the inevitable consequence of the observer’s disturbance
of the object of observation. Popper is quite explicit about
this. He describes the Copenhagen interpretation as:
. . . the claim that, in atomic theory, we have
to regard “the observer” or “the subject” as
particularly important, because atomic theory
takes its peculiar character largely from the
interference of the subject or the observer (and
his “measuring agencies”) with the physical
object under investigation. [1, p. 10]
We seem to be confronted here with a clear-cut failure
of objectivity, since the magnitude of the disturbance al-
legedly occasioned by the observer’s intervention presum-
ably varies from observer to observer, and from observa-
tion to observation, owing to its inherent unpredictability
(or “uncontrollability”, in Bohr’s quaint, early terminol-
ogy) [22, p. 3] [7, pp. 57-68].
But it would be seriously misleading to describe this
situation simply as a failure of objectivity, and to make
it the basis for the charge that physics has become the
stronghold of subjectivism. For one thing, we must be
careful about just who or what does the disturbing. While
Heisenberg himself sometimes speaks of the observer as
the “subject”, [22, p. 2] conjuring up the image of the
denizens of World 2, the proper object of our concern
is the purely physical interaction between the quantum
system under investigation and the observer, the latter
being considered now as nothing more than an especially
complicated physical system. Indeed, it is better to speak
simply of an interaction between the object and a measur-
ing instrument, and to leave conscious human observers
out of the picture entirely, for whatever the novelties of
observation in quantum mechanics, they remain the same
if human observers are replaced by instrumentation at-
tached to automatic recording devices. Thus, even if it
were true that every observation disturbs the observed
object in a different way, the difference is not due to the
involvement of different human subjects. It is, instead,
a mundane physical fact of a purely objective, World
3 sort. Furthermore, factoring out the human observer
makes it clear that the knowledge derived even from “dis-
turbing” observations is totally objective, for the result
preserved by the recording device needs only to be for-
mulated as a statement in order to become a publicly
debatable, World 3 entity, something that all researchers
can agree upon. Some physicists would question the
claim that the recorded results are objective. The most
straightforward description of the measurement process
implies that an instrument interacting with a system de-
scribed by a superposition will itself be in a superposition
at the conclusion of the measurement interaction, whereas
I am assuming that the instrument winds up in a definite
state. If it is in a superposition, then different observers
might, conceivably, find it in different states when they
look at it. Of course, I question this simple description
of measurement, but, unfortunately, there is no consen-
sus among physicists on an adequate quantum theory of
measurement [8, pp. 471-521] [30, pp. 159-226].
Another reason to be wary of drawing substantive philo-
sophical conclusions from Heisenberg’s disturbance anal-
ysis of indeterminacy is that talk about “disturbance” or
“interference” seems to beg one of the crucial questions at
issue in debates over objectivity and realism in quantum
mechanics. Specifically, it presupposes that the observed
system has a definite value of the parameter which is the
conjugate of the measured parameter (for example, a defi-
nite momentum in the case of a position measurement),
for otherwise it would be unclear what, if anything, is
being disturbed.
It is indeed true that, from a philosophical point of view,
one of the most important implications claimed for the
quantum theory is that it mandates a radical revision in
our understanding of the observer-observed relationship.
Bohr, Heisenberg and others have argued that the picture
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of the detached observer, which underlay the edifice of
classical scientific realism, must be abandoned in favor of
a model in which there is a far more intimate connection
between observer and object. In fact, a case can be made
for the claim that the two lose their separate identities
during, and for some time following the observation in-
teraction. This is a consequence of what is known as the
nonseparability of the quantum mechanical description
of interacting systems [30, pp. 75-156]. Interestingly,
Wigner proposes an extremely subjectivist interpretation
of quantum mechanics [31]. He adopts the account of
the measurement process described above and argues that
the superposition representing the instrument’s state is
reduced in the consciousness of the observer. Still, in
all of this, and Wigner’s musings about the reduction of
superpositions in consciousness notwithstanding [31], it
should be stressed that Bohr’s position is not at all like
Wigner’s, and there need be no mention of observing sub-
jects. If a conscious human observer plays any role at all,
his subjective consciousness is of no consequence; for an
understanding of observation in the quantum domain, we
need only consider the observer as a physical system.
No doubt some confusion about this matter has been
caused by the fact that Bohr occasionally speaks as if
what were at issue here is the “subject-object” relation-
ship, as when he talks of the urgent necessity, in the con-
sideration of quantum mechanical observations, of pay-
ing “proper attention to the placing of the object-subject
separation” [32, p. 79]. But a careful reading of these
passages reveals that this manner of speaking is nothing
more than Bohr’s concession to standard philosophical
parlance when he is attempting to explain to a broad au-
dience the “epistemological implications of the lesson
regarding our observational position, which the develop-
ment of physical science has impressed upon us,” [32, p.
78] and, in particular, when he is attempting to point up
the structural analogy between the observer-observed re-
lationship in quantum mechanics and the subject-object
relationship in psychology [33]. Ordinarily Bohr speaks
simply of the relationship between the observed object
and the measuring instruments we employ in observa-
tion, with no mention of an observing subject. In this
cleaner idiom, the need to attend to the placing of the
object-subject separation becomes the
necessity of discriminating in each experimen-
tal arrangement between those parts of the phys-
ical system considered which are to be treated
as measuring instruments and those which con-
stitute the objects under investigation. [9, p.
701]
Ironically, the very passage which Popper cites from Bohr
to back up his claim that the Copenhagen interpretation
stresses the interference of the subject with the object
under investigation, refers not to the subject, but to the
measuring instruments:
Indeed the finite interaction between object and
measuring agencies . . . entails . . . the necessity
of a final renunciation of the classical ideal . . .
and a radical revision of our attitude towards
the problem of physical reality. [9, p. 697]
The fact of the matter is that Bohr rejects, unequivocally,
the suggestion that his interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics assigns the subject any special role:
. . .the decisive point is that in neither case [nei-
ther relativity nor complementarity] does the
appropriate widening of our conceptual frame-
work imply any appeal to the observing subject,
which would hinder unambiguous communi-
cation of experience . . . in complementary de-
scription all subjectivity is avoided by proper
attention to the circumstances required for the
well-defined use of elementary physical con-
cepts. [34, p. 394]
The expression “unambiguous communication” alludes to
Bohr’s own conception of objectivity. In his more careful
moments, Heisenberg is equally clear about there being
no special role for the subject in quantum mechanics:
Of course the introduction of the observer must
not be misunderstood to imply that some kind
of subjective features are to be brought into the
description of nature. The observer has, rather,
only the function of registering decisions, . . .
and it does not matter whether the observer is
an apparatus or a human being. [35, p. 121]
Thus, though it is perhaps warranted to speak, as Popper
does, of Bohr’s having sanctioned an “intrusion of the
observer” into quantum theory, there is no warrant for
speaking, as Popper also does, of an “intrusion of the
subject”, as if the two kinds of intrusion came to the same
thing. It should be pointed out here that Bohr was, from
the start, sceptical of Heisenberg’s disturbance analysis
of indeterminacy [10] [32, p. 73]. As early as 1927 he
was exhorting readers who wished to grasp the full signif-
icance of Heisenberg’s formulae to consider not only the
“possibilities of observation”, but also the “possibilities
of definition”, meaning that we have to go beyond an
analysis of the observer-observed interaction to examine
the way concepts such as position and momentum are
employed in the description of quantum phenomena [7, p.
73].
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We earlier saw that Popper’s account of the etiology of
subjectivism in the Copenhagen interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics assigns a major role to the way Bohr and
colleagues are supposed to have interpreted the probabil-
ity calculus, the allure of the subjective interpretation of
probability being cited as a principal reason for their al-
leged choice of a subjective epistemic interpretation of the
state function. Do we have here the makings of a better
argument for the charge of subjectivism? Recall that the
subjective interpretation of probability amounts, roughly,
to the claim that the probability function is a measure
of an individual’s degree of confidence in the truth of a
proposition describing the event whose probability we
want to know. It is subjective because different individu-
als could assign different probabilities to the same event.
“Degree of confidence”, especially when understood as
something like “strength of belief”, has a pronounced
World 2 character. What is the evidence that Bohr and
the other Copenhagen theorists subscribed to this view of
probability?
Popper bases his case on the fact that many of the
thinkers he associates with the Copenhagen school portray
the lesson of indeterminacy as the existence of limitations
on our knowledge of the properties of quantum systems.
For example, Heisenberg, the source of this interpretive
tradition, comments:
The uncertainty principle refers to the degree
of indeterminateness in the possible present
knowledge of the simultaneous values of vari-
ous quantities with which the quantum theory
deals. [22, p. 20]
As Popper tells it, subjectivism infected the thinking of
the Copenhagen school because its members give the
wrong reasons for the probabilistic character of the quan-
tum theory, and
Foremost among these reasons is the argument
that it is our (necessary) lack of knowledge
– especially the limitations to our knowledge
discovered by Heisenberg and formulated in
his “principle of indeterminacy” or “princi-
ple of uncertainty” – which forces us to adopt
a probabilistic, and consequently a statistical,
theory. [1, p. 17]
As to why this leads to subjectivism, he continues:
. . . it is this mistaken belief that we have to ex-
plain the probabilistic character of quantum the-
ory by our (allegedly necessary) lack of knowl-
edge, rather than by the statistical character of
our problems, which has led to the intrusion of
the observer, or the subject into quantum the-
ory. It has led to this intrusion because the view
that a probabilistic theory is the result of lack of
knowledge leads inescapably to the subjectivist
interpretation of probability theory; that is, to
the view that the probability of an event mea-
sures the degree of somebody’s (incomplete)
knowledge of that event, or of his “belief” in
it. [1, pp. 17-18]
There can be no denying that adoption of a subjective in-
terpretation of probability would incline one to interpret
the quantum mechanical state function in a subjectively
epistemic manner. But several objections can be raised
to Popper’s analysis of the Copenhagen attitude toward
probability. To begin with, it is by no means obvious that
a limitations-on-knowledge interpretation of indetermi-
nacy leads “inescapably” to the subjective interpretation
of probability. It would depend, in part, on whether the
knowledge in question is of the subjective, World 2 va-
riety or the objective, World 3 variety. If it is the latter,
then, at best one might speak of an epistemic interpreta-
tion of probability, but not of a subjective interpretation,
at least not in the special pejorative sense that subjective
carries in Popper’s vocabulary. What I am here calling
an epistemic interpretation has much in common with
the “logical” theory of probability, or “probability1” in
Carnap’s terminology, which regards probability state-
ments, such as p(a, e) = r, as logical truths expressing
something like the degree of evidential support which a
body of evidence, e, provides for an hypothesis, a. Popper
considers the logical theory to be merely a “variant” of
the subjective interpretation [13, §48, p. 136]. But this
is a mistake, encouraged partly by some of the logical
theory’s proponents’ having spoken of logical probability
as a measure of degree of rational belief, and partly by
Popper’s systematic neglect of the distinction that one
might, in any case, draw between belief, simpliciter, and
rational belief, for talk of rational belief presumably al-
ludes to objective norms of rationality [25] [36, pp. 43-47,
238-241]. Indeterminacy would entail limitations on sub-
jective knowledge only if it were a consequence of an
observing subject’s special relationship with the observed
object. But, as I have argued, Popper’s attribution of
this view of indeterminacy to Bohr and Heisenberg is
a misreading of their positions. When indeterminacy is
correctly viewed as a feature of the physical relationship
between the observed object and the instruments used to
measure its various properties, then whatever limitations
it entails on our knowledge of quantum systems are prop-
erly seen as purely objective limitations, the same for all
observers. Popper’s failure to distinguish subjective and
objective knowledge in the context of the interpretation
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of probability is evident in the following passage, where
it is unclear which kind of knowledge is intended:
the various subjective interpretations have all
one thing in common: probability theory is
regarded as a means of dealing with the incom-
pleteness of our knowledge. [37, p. 25]
On a deeper level, it is not clear why tracing the need
for probabilities in quantum mechanics to our necessar-
ily limited knowledge of quantum systems (if this is in
fact what Bohr and Heisenberg do) commits one to in-
terpreting those probabilities in an epistemic fashion. To
take an example from a less controversial domain, there
would be no inconsistency in my claiming that I have to
describe the behavior of a tossed coin probabilistically
because there are no practical means by which I could
know all of the relevant initial conditions of a toss, while
nevertheless insisting that what I mean when I make a
probabilistic prediction about the outcome of a toss is
that in a hypothetical infinitely long run of similar tosses
a certain relative frequency of heads and tails would be
found.
But the most serious objection to Popper’s analysis
is simply that, aside from Heisenberg’s characterization
of the uncertainty principle as referring to an “indeter-
minateness” in our knowledge (which, one should note,
says nothing about probability, per se), there is little basis
for the claim that the Copenhagen interpretation views
limitations on knowledge as the explanation of the prob-
abilistic character of quantum mechanics. In fact, Bohr
explicitly rejects this account. In explaining why quantum
mechanics differs essentially from statistical mechanics,
where resort to a probabilistic description is generally
conceded to be the result merely of a lack of complete,
knowledge of all the relevant parameters of the systems
under investigation (and a science in which Popper also
finds significant traces of subjectivism), Bohr remarks:
. . .we have in each experimental arrangement
suited for the study of proper quantum phenom-
ena not merely to do with an ignoranee of the
value of certain physical quantities, but with
the impossibility of defining these quantities in
any unambiguous way. [9, p. 699]
Bohr’s position, in other words, is that we have to resort
to a probabilistic description in quantum mechanics be-
cause of limitations more basic than any limits on our
knowledge of the parameters of quantum systems. In
another place, Bohr comments:
. . . the statistical character of the uncertainty
relations in no way originates from any fail-
ure of measurements to discriminate within a
certain latitude between classically describable
states of the object, but rather expresses an es-
sential limitation of the applicability of classi-
cal physical ideas to the analysis of quantum
phenomena. [33, p. 311]
Bohr’s interpretation is not a variety of the intrinsic in-
definiteness interpretation. In his view, the parameters
conjugate to a measured parameter are not indefinite. In-
stead, he would say that the concepts corresponding to
these parameters do not even apply in such a context (e.g.
the concept of momentum does not apply in the context
of a position measurement) [38, 39].
One must be cautious about imputing views on the in-
terpretation of probability to Bohr and Heisenberg. As far
as I know, neither ever made any explicit pronouncements
on the interpretation question, and what little each does
say about the role of probabilities in quantum mechan-
ics can just as easily be read as suggesting an objective
interpretation as a subjective one. Ultimately, the ques-
tion is one of the possibilities for testing the quantum
theory’s probabilistic predictions, for, as Popper correctly
observes, the mark of an objective interpretation of prob-
ability is its securing the objective testability of prob-
ability statements [37, p. 25]. Popper argues that the
logical theory is not an objective interpretation precisely
because logical probability statements are “untestable tau-
tologies” [25, p. 357]. It is true that such statements
are not subject to empirical testing, but Popper has noted
elsewhere that the real test of the objectivity of scien-
tific statements is their susceptibility to inter-subjective
criticism [13, §8, p. 22] and logical probability state-
ments fare quite well by this criterion, for we can ques-
tion whether the degree of evidential support has been
properly assessed, just as we can criticize a deduction in
mathematics. Furthermore, Popper offers no evidence of
Bohr’s or Heisenberg’s having said anything that suggests
doubt about the testability of quantum mechanical predic-
tions. My guess is that if we had explained the options
to them, Bohr, at least, would have declared, without
hesitation, that he had always understood quantum me-
chanical probabilities in an objective sense, as referring
to the relative frequencies of results one would expect
to find in repeated measurements of a given parameter
on similarly prepared systems. Such an exercise being
impossible, however, the best course of action is to sus-
pend judgment. A case, of sorts, can even be made for
attributing something like a propensity interpretation to
Bohr; see section 5.
We must conclude that Popper has not established his
claim that physics has become “a stronghold of subjec-
tivist philosophy” under the influence of the interpretation
of quantum mechanics championed by Bohr. The allega-
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tion that the Copenhagen interpretation accords a special
role in quantum mechanics to the observing “subject” and
the charge that it incorporates a subjective interpretation
of probability are both unsubstantiated. Quotation of a
few equivocal remarks by a peripheral figure like Jeans,
a non-physicist like Schlick and even by a major figure
like Heisenberg, who, though responsible for some of the
most important formal developments in quantum mechan-
ics, was indirectly criticized by Bohr for the superficiality
of his views on interpretation, does not suffice to show
that Bohr’s position – the most sophisticated, subtle and
systematic of the views lumped together under the Copen-
hagen designation – is subjectivist. This is not to say that
Bohr never made mistakes, is never obscure and never
inconsistent. He is guilty of all these failings. But he is
not a subjectivist.
A more sympathetic reading of Bohr, and one that at-
tends to the many differences between Bohr and the other
Copenhagen thinkers, reveals that he is just as anxious as
Popper to preserve the objectivity of quantum mechanics,
even if his approach is somewhat different. In a discussion
of the aim of science, Bohr remarks:
. . . our task must be to account for [human] ex-
perience in a manner independent of individual
subjective judgement and therefore objective in
the sense that it can be unambiguously commu-
nicated in the common human language. [40,
pp. 63-64]
And of his own complementarity interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics he says:
The notion of complementarity does not imply
any renunciation of detailed analysis limiting
the scope of our inquiry, but simply stresses the
character of objective description, independent
of subjective judgment, in any field of experi-
ence where unambiguous communication es-
sentially involves regard to the circumstances
in which evidence is obtained. [41, p. 1105]
Unambiguous communicability is not the same thing as
intersubjective testability (though it might turn out that
both are secured by the same conditions), but a disagree-
ment over the definition of objectivity does not, by itself,
entitle Popper to conclude that Bohr’s interpretation is
not objective.
Finally, what about Popper’s claim that the Copen-
hagen interpretation asserts that “objective reality has
evaporated”? He offers no independent argument for this
claim, apparently on the assumption that it is implied by
the subjectivism charge. Is this claim any more warranted
than the latter? That Heisenberg believed that objective
reality has evaporated is certain, for he is the source of
the quoted remark [28, p. 100]. But this is another place
where we must be careful to distinguish Heisenberg’s
views from Bohr’s, for while Bohr is clearly critical of
the presuppositions of the kind of realism associated with
the world-view of classical physics, his criticism does not
extend as far as Popper suggests. Bohr’s position is not
that there is no quantum mechanical reality, but rather
that quantum mechanics forces us to reexamine and rede-
fine the circumstances under which we can speak of the
reality of the properties of quantum systems, the funda-
mental claim of his complementarity interpretation being
that we can regard complementary properties as real only
under incompatible experimental conditions, and never
simultaneously [42], because
these conditions constitute an inherent element
of the description of any phenomenon to which
the term ’physical reality’ can be properly at-
tached [9, p. 700]
We will return to Bohr’s attitude toward realism in sec-
tion 4, but it should already be clear that on this issue,
too, Popper’s attack on Bohr is, if nothing else, a bit
hasty. In his Autobiography, Popper says the following:
“About Bohr I said little in Logik der Forschung because
he was less explicit than Heisenberg, and because I was
reluctant to saddle Bohr with views which he might not
hold” [15, p. 111]. One wishes that Popper had continued
to display such reserve.
There is a deep dispute between Bohr and Popper,
for, as the previous quotation suggests, Bohr denies the
possibility of the simultaneous definiteness of conjugate
variables, while Popper asserts that they are always si-
multaneously definite, and this assertion is a central part
of Popper’s own interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Moreover, to someone who believes in simultaneous defi-
niteness, the claim that we cannot simultaneously know
both the position and momentum of a system with ar-
bitrary precision might appear to say more about our
knowledge than about the world, and hence, might appear
as a kind of subjectivism. But not only would such an
inference run the risk of the confusion, discussed above,
between the objective and subjective senses of knowledge,
it would also be objectionable on the ground that, since it
is based on the assumption of simultaneous definiteness,
it thus ignores the possibility that the apparent limitations
on our knowledge are a genuine reflection of some impor-
tant features of objective, quantum mechanical reality.
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4 Simultaneous definiteness and
the statistical scatter
interpretation of indeterminacy
As we saw above, Popper believes that physicists were
led down the garden path of subjectivism by their desire
to reconcile the theory’s probabilistic character with their
belief that it is also a fundamental theory, a theory of
individual quantum systems. At the time he wrote Logik
der Forschung, Popper believed that the way to avoid
subjectivism is to give up the latter belief. Accordingly,
he proposed an objective statistical interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics, which holds that the theory is true only
of ensembles or aggregates of systems [13, p. 234], and
the centerpiece of this alternative is the proposal that we
view the Heisenberg indeterminacy formulae as neither
the consequence of limitations on measurement nor an
expression of intrinsic indefiniteness, but as statistical
scatter relations [13, §75]. Popper later believed that
we have an objective probabilistic theory of individual
systems, which is embodied in his later propensity in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics, and thus he gave up
the claim that quantum mechanics only refers to ensem-
bles; but he still defended the statistical scatter view of
indeterminacy and all that it presupposes [1, pp. 20-21].
To interpret the indeterminacy formulae as statistical
scatter relations is, first, to assume that atomic systems
can possess simultaneously sharp values of their conju-
gate parameters, and, then, to construe the formulae as
expressing lower limits on the scatter of the results of
measurements of these parameters on any ensemble of
such systems. For example, imagine that we have a de-
vice, such as a screen with a slit in it, which selects from
a beam of incoming particles only those whose (definite)
positions are confined to the region qx ± 12∆qx. This se-
lection defines an ensemble of particles according to their
positions. The scatter interpretation would then imply
that the (definite) results of measurements of the mo-
menta of the particles of this ensemble must be scattered
over a range no smaller than ∆px ≥ ~2∆qx . In Popper’s
words, the Heisenberg formulae, construed thus, “mean
only that there are limits to the statistical homogeneity”
of the results [1, p. 21].
What is really controversial is not the scatter interpre-
tation per se, but the assumption upon which it rests, that,
contrary to the standard interpretations of indeterminacy,
simultaneously precise conjugate parameters are possi-
ble. In a bold gesture, Popper claims not only that this
assumption is compatible with quantum mechanics, but
also that simultaneously precise measurements of these
parameters are possible and, in fact, necessary for testing
the statistical predictions of the theory [1, p. 20]. All of
these assertions are questionable.
Popper’s argument regarding simultaneously precise
measurements starts with a critique of some early thought
experiments which Heisenberg used to illustrate his own
interpretation of indeterminacy. The experiments use
standard methods of measuring either the position or mo-
mentum of an atomic system, and they all have this much
in common: when the physical details of the measure-
ment procedure are examined, say in the case of a position
measurement, it is allegedly found that the measurement
necessarily produces a mechanical disturbance of the ob-
served system’s momentum of precisely the magnitude
required to satisfy the indeterminacy relations [22, pp.
21-30].
A typical way to measure momentum (the product
of mass and velocity) is to combine two position mea-
surements. Knowing a particle’s mass, we measure its
position at two different times and divide the resulting
distance by the time of flight to get the velocity, which
we multiply by the mass in order to get the momentum.
If we allow enough time to elapse between the position
measurements, momentum measurements of theoretically
unlimited accuracy are possible. However, as Heisenberg
points out, the accuracy thus obtained pertains only to
the particle’s momentum before the second measurement,
because the momentum uncertainty necessarily engen-
dered by this measurement renders the result computed
from the two measurements useless for predictions of
the particle’s momentum after the second position mea-
surement. Heisenberg concludes that while retrodictive
momentum measurements of unlimited accuracy are pos-
sible, predictive measurements must always conform to
the restrictions of the indeterminacy formulae [22, p. 25].
(The terminology – predictive and retrodictive measure-
ments – is Popper’s, not Heisenberg’s [1, p. 25]).
Popper’s criticism of Heisenberg first took the form of
a head-on attempt to show, by means of another thought
experiment, that predictive measurements violating the
indeterminacy relations were also possible [43] [13, §77].
But shortly after the publication of the experiment Ein-
stein detected an error in it [13, §*xii]. With the failure
of this approach, Popper shifted the focus of his criticism
to Heisenberg’s concession that retrospective violations
of the indeterminacy principle are possible. Heisenberg
explained his attitude toward such violations as follows:
This formulation makes it clear that the uncer-
tainty relation does not refer to the past; if the
velocity of the electron is at first known and the
position then exactly measured, the position
for times previous to the measurement may be
calculated. Then for these past times ∆p∆q is
smaller than the usual limiting value, but this
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knowledge of the past is of a purely specula-
tive character, since it can never (because of the
unknown change in momentum caused by the
position measurement) be used as an initial con-
dition in any calculation of the future progress
of the electron and thus cannot be subjected
to experimental verification. It is a matter of
personal belief whether such a calculation con-
cerning the past history of the electron can be
ascribed any physical reality or not. [22, p. 20]
Popper welcomes the concession, but quite rightly attacks
Heisenberg’s crudely positivistic interpretation of the sig-
nificance of retrodictions. Referring to the last sentence
of the previous quotation. Popper remarks:
But it is not a matter of personal belief: the mea-
surements in question are needed for testing the
statistical laws (1) and (2) [the indeterminacy
formulae] that is, the scatter relations . . . To
question whether the so ascertained “past his-
tory of the electron can be ascribed any physical
reality or not” is to question the significance of
an indispensible standard method of measure-
ment (retrodictive, of course); indispensible,
especially, for quantum mechanics. But once
we ascribe physical reality to measurements for
which, as Heisenberg admits, ∆p∆q  h , the
whole situation changes completely: for now
there can be no question whether, according
to the quantum theory, an electron can have a
precise position and momentum. It can. [1, p.
27]
Up to a point, Popper is right. If simultaneously precise
retrodictive measurements are possible, we have little
choice but to ascribe reality to their results. But he should
not have been so quick to trust Heisenberg’s authority
regarding the existence of such measurements. Popper’s
argument for simultaneous definiteness rests largely on
Heisenberg’s analysis. But maybe Heisenberg was wrong.
In fact, I think Heisenberg and, thus, Popper are both
wrong, and the error in their reasoning is simple to detect.
Consider the case of a retrodictive momentum measure-
ment, one consisting of two successive position measure-
ments. The putative violation of indeterminacy arises
because we can presumably infer the particle’s momen-
tum at any time prior to the second position measurement,
and thus, in particular, at the time of the first position
measurement, with arbitrary precision. Whatever the un-
certainty attaching to the first position measurement, ∆qx,
it would follow that we could infer a momentum at the
time of that measurement more precise than permitted by
the indeterminacy relations, that is, with ∆px  ~2∆qx (the
reasoning, and the criticism, are the same if we look at the
particle’s position and momentum immediately prior to
the second position measurement). But this conclusion is
incorrect. What we infer from the two position measure-
ments is not the instantaneous momentum of the particle,
but only its average momentum during the interval. If we
assume that the momentum was constant during that inter-
val, then the average and instantaneous momenta would
be equal, but otherwise, no conclusion about the momen-
tum at any specific time is licensed. Of course, one can
typically advance theoretical arguments for assuming the
approximate constancy of the momentum, such as the ab-
sence of any external forces. But notice that the assertion,
for whatever reason, of a precisely constant momentum
– the necessary hidden assumption in the argument for
retrospective violations of indeterminacy – again begs the
very question at issue, in as much as it would be the as-
sertion of constant definite momentum, which is exactly
what the indeterminacy relations are believed by Bohr
and others to disallow (unless, of course, the position is
completely indeterminate).
Popper, on his own, adduced other examples of putative
simultaneously precise measurements of conjugate vari-
ables. I think they all fail, but for now, I will only examine
the most interesting one. It draws upon a thought exper-
iment first proposed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen
(EPR) in 1935 as part of their famous attempt to prove the
incompleteness of quantum mechanics [44], but I will dis-
cuss Popper’s analysis as it applies to another experiment,
suggested by David Bohm, which is simpler than the EPR
experiment, though formally identical to it in all relevant
respects [45, pp. 614-622]. The simplicity of the Bohm
version of the experiment is largely due to its employing
discrete variables, rather than the continuous position and
momentum variables of the EPR experiment. Consider
the following situation. A spin-zero particle decays into
two spin- 12 particles, A and B. Assume that we have filters
which allow us to select pairs of decay products traveling
in opposite directions without affecting their spins, and
that we have devices (called Stern-Gerlach apparatuses)
which allow us eventually to measure the spins of the
decay particles along any spin axis orthogonal to the par-
ticles’ paths. The quantum mechanical description of the
decay process entails that total spin is conserved. Thus,
the spin of the original particle being zero, the sum of the
spins of the decay products must also be zero along all
spin axes. Since the decay products are spin- 12 particles,
the spin conservation principle implies that if we measure
the spin of particle A along the z-axis and get a result
of − 12 we can infer that the z-spin of particle B is + 12 .
Popper’s argument would be that it is possible (at least
by accident) to measure simultaneously the z-spin of A
and the y-spin of B, and then to infer values for the y-spin
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of A and the z-spin of B by conservation of spin. Thus,
he would conclude, we can make simultaneously precise
measurements of both the z-spin and y-spin of A and B,
even though spins along orthogonal axes, being conjugate
variables, are supposedly not simultaneously measurable.
And if we can measure both components of spin, we have
little reason to deny their reality. For Poppers actual ar-
gument, which assumes the original EPR version of the
thought experiment, see [13, §*xi].
Simultaneous measurements of the z-spin of A and the
y-spin of B are possible. What is questionable about Pop-
per’s analysis is, again, the inferences drawn from the
results of these measurements. The particular problem
in the present case is the uncritical use of conservation
arguments. Spin conservation is implied by the quantum
formalism only in the following restricted sense: if the
same component of spin is measured on both decay prod-
ucts, then the probability of the results summing to zero
is equal to unity. By itself, the formalism licenses no
inferences about spin conservation in the case of measure-
ments of different components, which is the case Popper
contemplates. In order to invoke conservation arguments
in this case, additional assumptions are needed. Specifi-
cally, one must assume precisely what the possibility of
simultaneous measurements are held to establish, namely,
that each particle actually possesses a definite spin along
every axis, and not just along the axis for which the spin
is measured. (One must also assume that these definite
spins are correlated as required by the conservation prin-
ciple.) Only thus can a direct measurement of, say, the
z-spin of A be held also to constitute a measurement of
the z-spin of B.
What the foregoing reflections show is that Popper can-
not argue for the simultaneous definiteness thesis by ap-
pealing to the possibility of simultaneous measurements
of conjugate parameters, because his putative examples of
the latter are interpretable as simultaneous measurements
of the necessary sort only if one assumes simultaneous
definiteness. In other words, Popper is arguing in a circle.
There would be nothing particularly vicious about this
circle if there were independent evidence for the definite-
ness thesis, but such evidence has not been provided, and
none is likely to be forthcoming. Indeed, in this con-
nection Popper’s exploitation of the EPR-type thought
experiment is especially ironic, because that experiment
can be turned into an empirical argument against both
the simultaneous definiteness thesis and a broad class of
realistic interpretations of quantum mechanics.
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen sought to use their
thought experiment to prove that quantum mechanics
is incomplete. Their argument begins with a crucial as-
sumption, namely, a criterion of physical reality:
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we
can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability
equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity,
then there exists an element of physical reality
corresponding to this physical quantity. [44, p.
777]
Then they reason, in effect, that the possibility of indirect,
non-disturbing measurements of the kind sketched above,
such as a measurement of the z-spin of B carried out by
first measuring the z-spin of A and then inferring a value
for B by the conservation principle, shows that, without
disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty the
values of two of its conjugate variables. This is because
we could have measured either the z-spin or the y-spin of
A, and thus could have made a prediction of the value of
either component of B’s spin, and whichever component
we predict, a subsequent direct measurement of it would
confirm our prediction. But then it follows, according
to the reality criterion, that both the z-spin and y-spin of
B are real, and since the orthodox quantum theory rules
out the simultaneous definiteness of conjugate variables,
one would have to conclude that quantum mechanics is
incomplete. In reply, Bohr pointed out that the two in-
direct measurements cannot be executed simultaneously,
since the necessary experimental arrangements are incom-
patible (for example, the Stern-Gerlach apparatus which
measures A’s spin cannot be oriented in such a way as to
measure simultaneously spin along two different axes),
and since he held that the experimental conditions
constitute an inherent element of the descrip-
tion of any phenomenon to which the term
’physical reality’ can be properly attached. [9, p.
700]
he therefore denied that the EPR argument established
the simultaneous reality of conjugate variables.
Because Bohr makes his own strong assumptions about
the circumstances under which we can speak of the reality
of quantum properties, his reply is hardly a refutation of
the EPR argument. But something close to a refutation is
possible, or, at least, a very uncomfortable dilemma can
be forced upon EPR. Because of the thought experiment’s
basic symmetry, EPR’s premises actually imply the si-
multaneous reality of the conjugate parameters of both A
and B (which is precisely what Popper wants to assert),
and this implies, in turn, that each of the systems has its
own separate physical state. That EPR are committed
to this assumption was first suggested in [46]; but for a
detailed defense of the attribution one should consult my
dissertation [47]. A helpful discussion of these issues
may be found in [30, §8-9]. If there is any doubt that
Popper agrees with this consequence of the EPR point of
view, consider the following remark:
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Thus the so-called “paradox” of Einstein,
Podolsky, and Rosen is not a paradox but a
valid argument, for it established just this: that
we must ascribe to particles a precise position
and momentum, which was denied by Bohr and
his school [1, p. 28]
If one believes, in this sense, that the two systems have
their own “independent reality” from the time they cease
to interact, it would seem to follow that whenever we
perform a direct measurement on one of the systems, the
result will depend solely on the properties of that system.
But while this might appear to be an obvious fact about
measurement, it can be shown that the locality assumption
(i.e., the results of a measurement depend solely on the
local properties of the measured object) necessarily leads
to predictions for a class of correlation measurements,
which can be performed with the EPR-type experimen-
tal set-up, that differ markedly from the predictions of
the quantum theory. Moreover, experiments of this type
have been performed, and the results confirm, to a high
degree, the quantum mechanical predictions. The basic
theorems, which are the work of J. S. Bell, and the ex-
perimental results are nicely summarized in [48]. (For an
elegant, non-technical treatment, one might look at [49]
by David Mermin; his speculations about the philosophi-
cal implications of Bell’s work should, however, be taken
with a grain of salt). What this shows is that one must
either give up the realistic thesis that previously interact-
ing systems go into separate physical states (which, of
course, entails a denial that they go into separate, defi-
nite states), or assume the existence of nonlocal effects,
that is, superluminal signals by means of which the result
of a measurement performed on one of the systems can
be influenced by our choice of which parameter we will
measure on the other system. The hypothetical signals
would have to be faster than the speed of light because
we can design the experiment in such a way as to insure
that there would not be adequate time for a subluminous
signal to travel from one Stern-Gerlach apparatus to the
other. Nor will it do to argue, if one finds the latter op-
tion unsavory, that while the independent reality of the
two systems might not be found at the level of the tra-
ditional quantum mechanical properties, such as spin, it
may exist at a deeper level, say at the level of some hy-
pothetical “hidden parameters”. For the negative result is
quite general: any technique, which makes measurement
results solely dependent on a system’s local properties, be
they hidden or not, will yield the wrong predictions [50].
Quantum mechanics avoids nonlocal effects precisely by
refusing to assign separate (let alone definite) states to
the two systems, describing them instead by means of a
single state function for the composite system, A + B, a
state function which cannot be decomposed as a product
or sum of separate state functions for A and B.
These results must be discomfiting to Popper. Since
the simultaneous definiteness thesis implies that previ-
ously interacting systems have separate physical states,
the only way Popper can continue to maintain that thesis,
and to assert that it is compatible with quantum mechan-
ics, is to assume the existence of nonlocal effects. While
no one has yet provided any independent evidence for
such, effects, one may, of course, still assert their exis-
tence as a conjecture, but it should be noted that the price
for securing compatibility with quantum mechanics is an
assumption that is incompatible with the relativity the-
ory’s assertion that the speed of light is the upper limit
for the propagation of physical effects. And, to repeat,
this problem is quite general: any attempt to give a realis-
tic interpretation of quantum mechanics will be saddled
with nonlocality as long as it attributes an independent
reality, at whatever level, to previously interacting sys-
tems. The philosophical implications of the work on non-
locality are discussed, with slightly different emphases,
in [51,52]. The latter essay should be read with some cau-
tion. d’Espagnat argues that the predictions which have
been refuted by experiment are actually entailed by three
premises: realism, locality and the “free use of induction”.
Supporters of Popper might take solace from this claim,
arguing that realism can be saved by denying the third
premise, something Popper would have us do anyway.
But I think d’Espagnat is simply mistaken in asserting
that induction is a necessary premise in the derivation;
the crucial extrapolation which he says [52, p. 177] has
to be supported by induction could just as well be con-
strued as a highly corroborated conjecture, and not as an
inductive extrapolation from limited evidence. Caution is
also advised regarding Shimony’s rather instrumentalistic
reading of Bohr’s position.
I have argued that Popper’s arguments for the possibil-
ity of simultaneously precise measurements of conjugate
variables are flawed, and that the thesis that quantum sys-
tems possess simultaneously definite values of conjugate
variables (whether measurable or not) can be maintained
only at a considerable price. What, finally, of his claim
that measurements more precise than those presumably
allowed by the indeterminacy relations are needed to test
those relations? Do the former negative results mean
that the indeterminacy relations cannot be put to a test?
I think not. If the Heisenberg formulae were scatter re-
lations of the sort Popper claims, then simultaneously
precise measurements would be required to test them.
But the difficulties with the simultaneous definiteness
thesis argue against this interpretation. The indetermi-
nacy formulae are better viewed simply as relating the
expected scatter or standard deviation in the results of
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measurements of conjugate observables on similarly pre-
pared systems. Nothing requires that the measurements
be carried out on the same system. Thus, one can mea-
sure the position of half the members of an ensemble of
similarly prepared systems, and then the momentum of
the other half. If, according to ordinary rules of statistical
inference, the product of the standard deviations of the
two sets of measurements is significantly lower than the
minimum posited by the indeterminacy relations, then
those relations can be considered falsified; if the product
is not significantly lower, then the relations have passed
this particular test. No simultaneous measurements are
possible, none are required.
5 The propensity interpretation of
quantum mechanics
The latest stage in the development of Popper’s thinking
on the quantum theory is represented by his propensity
interpretation of probability and quantum mechanics. In
one sense this idea betokens a radical shift by Popper,
for while he formerly thought that physicists were pursu-
ing a will-o’-the-wisp in attempting to forge an objective
probabilistic theory of individual events, he later believed
that the propensity theory accomplishes precisely this
goal. But in a more important sense, no shift at all is in-
dicated, for Popper’s purpose in introducing the concept
of propensity is the same as it was when he advocated
a statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics: the
defense of objectivity and realism. The propensity in-
terpretation’s credentials as a candidate for a realistic
interpretation of quantum mechanics are impressive, and
its further refinement is an important item on the agenda
for research into foundational questions. But there are
some confusions in Popper’s account of the propensity
interpretation, and some of his claims on its behalf are
extravagant. Moreover, I will argue that when the nega-
tive results of section 4 are taken into account, a genuine
rapprochement between the propensity interpretation and
Bohr’s complementarity interpretation is no longer out of
the question.
Popper says that he developed the propensity interpre-
tation from a criticism of the way the relative frequency
interpretation handles the probability of individual or sin-
gular events. (Remember that it was this difficulty which,
according to Popper, led to the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion’s allegedly subjective view of quantum mechanical
probabilities. Popper gives an account of the development
of the propensity interpretation in [1, pp. 30-34] [37] [53].
The latter two treatments emphasize the development
from the frequency theory). Popper asks us to consider
a very long actual sequence of tosses of a loaded die, for
which the probability of turning up a six is 14 , and to imag-
ine interspersed among these tosses, at unknown places,
a few tosses of a fair die. The relative frequency of sixes
in this sequence will still be virtually indistinguishable
from 14 , the more so the longer we imagine the sequence
to be, and thus there is no obstacle to our continuing to
assert that the probability of throwing a six on a toss of
the loaded die is 14 . What about the probability of getting
a six on one of the throws of the fair die? We still want
to assert that this probability is 16 , even though the toss
is a member of an actual sequence in which the relative
frequency of sixes is 14 . But why? According to Popper,
the frequency theorist can only answer that it is because
the toss of the fair die, though a member of the afore-
mentioned actual sequence, is also a member of a virtual
sequence of identical tosses, that is, a virtual sequence of
tosses of a fair die, and the probability of getting a six on a
toss of the fair die is properly assessed by considering the
latter sequence. This may appear, at first glance, to be just
a slight modification of the frequency theory, specifically,
a stipulation that the only admissable sequences for defin-
ing probabilities are sequences of repeated similar trials,
or, in other words, sequences characterized by repeated
realizations of a set of generating conditions. But Popper
argues that this really represents “a transition from the
frequency interpretation to the propensity interpretation,”
because “probability may now be said to be a property of
the generating conditions” [37, p. 34]. His reasoning is
as follows:
. . . if the probability is a property of the gener-
ating conditions – of the experimental arrange-
ment – and if it is therefore considered as de-
pending upon these conditions, then the an-
swer given by the frequency theorist implies
that the virtual frequency must also depend on
these conditions. But this means that we have
to visualise the conditions as endowed with a
tendency, or disposition, or propensity, to pro-
duce sequences whose frequencies are equal to
the probabilities; which is precisely what the
propensity interpretation asserts. [37, p. 35]
A clearer way to put Popper’s point would be to note
that the frequency interpretation gives us no reason for
choosing one virtual sequence over another, say the vir-
tual sequence of tosses of the fair die rather than a virtual
sequence of tosses of various dice, some of them loaded.
The propensity interpretation gives us a reason by making
probability a property of the experimental conditions. In
Popper’s eyes, the chief virtue of the propensity inter-
pretation, and the characteristic that makes it useful in
giving an objective, realistic interpretation of quantum
mechanics, is that it enables us to regard probability
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as a real physical property of the single physical
experiment or, more precisely, of the experimen-
tal conditions laid down by the rule that defines
the conditions for the (virtual) repetition of the
experiment. [1, p. 33]
Various critics have taken Popper to task for obscurities in
his formulation of the propensity interpretation, one of the
main worries being that it is still not clear how the propen-
sity theory differs from a frequency theory [54, 55]. The
likely cause of the critics’ worry is Popper’s ill-considered
claim that the propensity interpretation regards probabil-
ity statements “as statements about frequencies in virtual
(infinite) sequences of well characterized experiments,”
which he thinks is the same as regarding them “as state-
ments about some measure of a property ... of the whole
experimental arrangement” [1, p. 32]. Indeed, if we take
relative frequencies in virtual sequences as measures of
propensity, then the distinction between the two interpre-
tations blurs. But Popper’s claim is simply a mistake,
for while the propensity theory may have been developed
through reflection on the frequentist’s talk of virtual se-
quences, nothing requires that we take relative frequences
in virtual sequences as the measure of propensities.
One can formulate the propensity interpretation as the
thesis that probabilities are theoretical primitives, which
are implicitly defined by a suitable set of axioms for the
probability calculus, and which we associate with experi-
mental arrangements or generating conditions, either on
the basis of experience or as a result of considerations
of physical theory, in order to characterize the tendency
or propensity of an arrangement to produce outcomes
of a certain sort. Probability statements, thus construed,
would be tested, as Popper notes, by actual statistical
frequencies [1, p. 32], but to say this is not to say that
the statements are interpreted in terms of frequencies.
Interpreting a formal system like the probability calculus
is a matter of finding models for it. Probabilities might be
modeled by relative frequencies; they can just as well be
modeled by propensities.
To be sure, Popper has not given a general, formal
definition of propensity, comparable to the ones that can
be given for relative frequency, but that is not necessary
in order to claim that propensities provide a model for
the probability calculus. All that is required is an unam-
biguous rule for assigning numerical values (Popper calls
them weights) [1, p. 32] to the propensities, a rule which
thus allows us to define a function that can be shown to
satisfy the probability axioms. Nor is it right to demand
one rule and one definition for all domains of inquiry.
Why, for example, should we expect biological propensi-
ties and physical propensities to be measured in the same
way? How they are to be measured is a task for biological
and physical theory to decide.
In the case of quantum mechanics, the rule is provided
by Born’s statistical interpretation of the state function.
More specifically, the quantum mechanical rule may be
formulated thus: let H be the Hilbert space associated
with a system, S , whose state is represented by the vector
|ψ〉 inH ; let Aˆ be a Hermitian operator onH correspond-
ing to the observable of interest; and let PˆA(x) be the
projection operator onto the subspace ofH spanned by
the eigenvectors of Aˆ corresponding to the eigenvalue
x. The probability that a measurement of the observ-
able represented by Aˆ will yield the value x is given by:
〈ψ|PˆA(x)|ψ〉. Only if we have no theory to draw upon need
we resort to frequencies for an estimate of the numerical
value of a propensity. But here it is misleading to speak of
frequencies as providing a measure of the propensity; we
can assume that the measure will be provided by some as
yet undiscovered theory (or one too complicated to bother
with, for practical purposes, as in the case of dice rolling),
and that observed, actual frequencies suggest what that
measure would be. In no case need we resort to virtual
frequencies.
One of the most sensible features of the propensity
interpretation is the insistence that propensities be viewed
not as properties of individual objects, such as a die by
itself, but as relational properties of whole experimental
arrangements. As Popper notes, the probability of throw-
ing a six with a loaded die does not depend solely on
the die; the weaker the gravitational field, for instance,
the more this probability will approach that for a fair
die [53, p. 68]. Nor does the probability of a coin’s land-
ing heads-up depend solely on the coin; if we toss it on
a flat surface, the probability is 12 but if we toss it on a
surface containing a number of slots which might catch
the coin on edge, the probability of heads will be less than
1
2 [1, p. 39].
But Popper goes too far when he suggests that relativiz-
ing propensities to experimental contexts at last provides
a solution to the wave packet reduction problem in quan-
tum mechanics. His argument is that if we view quantum
mechanical probabilities as propensitifes, wave packet re-
duction is seen to be identical with a trivial, non-puzzling,
and thoroughly classical phenomenon that can be demon-
strated with a pin board [1, pp. 33-36]. Assume that
we start with a symmetrical pin board. The more balls
we role down, the closer their resulting distribution will
approximate a normal distribution, which can be taken
to represent the probability distribution, p(a, e1), for a
single ball’s reaching a specific place on a specific trial.
If we vary the experimental situation by looking only
at those balls which happen to hit a specific pin (which
Popper says is like performing a position measurement
on the balls), we get a different final distribution, which
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may represent the probability distribution, p(a, e2), for
these balls’ reaching a specific place. Popper contends
that exactly the same kind of thing happens in the case of
quantum mechanical measurement, and thus that the wave
packet collapse is to be explained as nothing more than
the result of a change in the experimental conditions: be-
fore a measurement is performed, the theory predicts one
probability distribution, after the measurement it predicts
another distribution; the difference is that the performance
of a measurement changes the experimental situation.
Two comments are in order. First, as Popper’s critics
have noted [54, pp. 466-467], and as Popper himself,
in effect, conceded, the key to this approach to wave
packet reduction is not the propensity interpretation, but
the recognition that the relevant probability distributions
represent relative or conditional probabilities, rather than
absolute ones, and this point could just as easily have been
made by a frequency theorist [14, p. 73]. The move to
conditional probabilities certainly appears more natural
from the propensity point of view, but nothing precludes
the frequentist’s offering the same solution.
Second, and more importantly, Popper’s suggestion
does not go far enough. Even von Neumann’s solution of
the reduction problem by means of the projection postu-
late recognizes that different probability distributions are
called for before and after a measurement. What makes
the projection postulate objectionable is that it posits a
principle for the evolution of states during observation
which differs dramatically from the principle of evolu-
tion under other circumstances. As it stands, Popper’s
analysis of wave packet reduction is open to the same
objection. To be sure, we are given a reason for picking
a new probability distribution after the measurement is
performed, But if the propensities which these probability
distributions are supposed to represent are real properties
(even of the whole experimental arrangement), we ought
to be able to trace their continuous temporal evolution,
and this Popper has not told us how to do. My guess is
that a wholly satisfactory solution will be achieved only
when the propensity interpretation’s hint that quantum
mechanical reality resides in the whole experimental ar-
rangement is taken up in a thoroughgoing reformulation
of the quantum formalism, a reformulation that makes the
state function itself a property of the whole experimen-
tal arrangement. The standard formalism treats the state
function as a context-independent property of the system.
Popper, himself, seems to be a bit confused on this point.
In one place he says “the ψ function describes physical
realities”, portraying this as the lesson of the propensity
interpretation [53, p. 69]. But that interpretation regards
propensities, which are properties of whole experimen-
tal arrangements, as real. The ψ function, as standardly
defined, is not a property of whole experimental arrange-
ments, and thus the propensity interpretation does not
entail that the ψ function describes reality. One could
take an instrumentalistic attitude toward the ψ function
and still regard quantum mechanical propensities as real.
Popper quotes Heisenberg saying that the reduction rep-
resents a transition from the possible to the actual [1, p.
37], a transition which is completed when “the actual is
selected from the possible, which, is done by the ‘ob-
server”’ [12, p. 23]. What encourages Popper in thinking
that the propensity interpretation already provides a com-
plete solution to the wave packet reduction problem is
his belief that the problem is solely a result of the Copen-
hagen interpretation’s alleged grant of special status to
the observer in quantum mechanics (the idea being that
it is the observer’s intervention during measurement that
brings about the reduction). Showing that it can be ex-
plained, instead, merely as the result of a change in ex-
perimental conditions surely does away with any need to
invoke the observer. But, as I argued in section 3, this is a
misreading of the Copenhagen interpretation, or, at least,
of Bohr’s philosophy. And, in any case, wave packet
reduction involves deeper formal issues. Popper’s claim
that the propensity idea solves the wave packet reduction
problem is but part of his larger claim that it helps us to
view quantum mechanics as a statistical theory, and thus
takes the mystery out of quantum theory . . .
by pointing out that all the apparent myster-
ies would also involve thrown dice, or tossed
pennies – exactly as they do electrons [53, p.
68]
Patrick Suppes has criticized the assertion that quantum
mechanics is a statistical theory on the grounds that, in it
the joint distribution of noncommuting random
variables [such as position and momentum]
turns out not to be a proper joint distribution in
the classical sense of probability [55, p. 771]
Suppes is correct, but it is important to note that his
conclusion depends on our calculating the quantum me-
chanical joint distribution from the standard, context-
independent, quantum mechanical state function. I sus-
pect that if we could reformulate quantum mechanics, as
per my suggestion, in such a way as to make the state
function a property of whole experimental contexts, we
would then get classical joint distributions. Thus, I think
Popper is wrong in believing that a simple reinterpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics reveals it to be a classical,
statistical theory. But the propensity interpretation points
the way to a reformulation of the theory that might fit this
description.
Another claim that Popper makes for the propensity
interpretation is that it solves the problem of the wave-
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particle relationship, and thus presumably, leads us out of
“the great quantum muddle”. This claim, too, needs to be
scrutinized. In general terms, the muddle consists in mis-
taking a property of a probability distribution function for
a property of either the outcomes (such as a toss of the die
yielding a six) whose probability that function provides,
or of some element of the system (such as the die, itself)
to which those outcomes occur. Physicists make this kind
of mistake whenever they say things like “an electron
is both a particle and a wave”, for what is wave-like is
not the electron itself, but the electron’s state function,
ψ(x), and the resulting probability distribution for its po-
sition, given by: p(x) = ψ∗(x)ψ(x) = |ψ(x)|2. Others have
criticized the claim that electrons are waves in any real
physical sense, pointing out, for example, that we are
dealing here not with waves in 3-dimensional physical
space, but waves in an abstract, multi-dimensional param-
eter space, as evidenced by the fact that the probability
distribution for the electron’s momentum is also, usually,
wave-like. But Popper has identified the basic confusion
more clearly than perhaps any other writer [1, pp. 18-20].
However, as in the case with wave-packet reduction,
the propensity interpretation does not seem to be essential
to the clarification. A frequency theorist could also warn
us not to confuse the shape of the distribution of balls
on a pin board with the shape of the balls themselves. A
propensity theorist might be less likely to fall into the
confusion in the first place, but clear thinking is the real
safeguard, not adherence to a particular interpretation of
probability.
Popper’s own view of the relationship between par-
ticles and waves avoids the “quantum muddle”, but is
flawed in another way. He says that “particles are impor-
tant objects of experimentation” whereas the often wave-
shaped probability distributions are, on the propensity
interpretation, “properties of the experimental arrange-
ment” [1, p. 39]. What we have, then, is not a relationship
between particles and waves, but one between “particles
and their statistics” [1, p. 38], and it is misleading to
speak of a duality between them. Popper is right that talk
of duality is misleading. But so is talk of the “relationship
between particles and their statistics” and this for two rea-
sons. First, as Popper himself has stressed, propensities
are properties of whole experimental arrangements, not
of the particles investigated by those arrangements, so the
crucial relationship is one between experimental arrange-
ments and their statistics, not particles and their statistics,
for, properly speaking, particles themselves have no statis-
tics. Second, Popper’s attitude toward particles is wholly
classical, except, of course, for his agreeing that they do
not obey deterministic laws. In particular, as was pointed
out in section 4, he views particles as real entities en-
dowed at all times with a complete set of simultaneously
definite properties. But, this view of particles is unten-
able, or, at least, if the statistical predictions of quantum
mechanics are correct (and we have no reason to doubt
them), Popper’s view of particles can only be maintained
at the expense of assuming nonlocal effects, which means
contradicting the theory of relativity. In sum, particles, as
Popper understands them, might not exist at all.
Popper asserts that both particles and propensities are
real [1, p. 39]. In light of the difficulties plaguing the
simultaneous definiteness thesis, I would urge Popper to
give up the claim about the reality of particles, and rest
his realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics solely
on real propensities. The propensity interpretation does
not require us to talk of particles. All we need speak of
are experimental arrangements and their propensities to
yield certain kinds of outcomes when certain kinds of
measurements are conducted with them. This does not en-
tail denying the reality of atomic objects, it simply means
that we would consider them real only as constituents of
experimental arrangements.
Such a reworking of Popper’s propensity interpretation
opens up, finally, the possibility of a rapprochement of
sorts between Popper and Bohr. Nowhere does one find
Bohr speaking of “propensities”. The interpretation of the
probability calculus is the kind of formal issue in which
he displays little interest. And, of course, Bohr’s opaque
prose style makes it difficult to say exactly what his views
are on a number of issues. But in his own way he too
emphasizes that solving the problem of objectivity in
quantum mechanics requires our according whole experi-
mental arrangements a central role in the interpretation of
the theory. He also sees that the statistical character of the
theory is a consequence of the fact different outcomes are
ordinarily obtained upon repetition of one and the same
experiment.
Recall that, for Bohr, objectivity is a matter of the un-
ambiguous communicability of experience. What makes
quantum mechanics unique is that here an unambiguous
account of experience is made more difficult to achieve
because of the intimate relationship between measuring
instruments and objects of investigation, which means
that we have to pay special attention to experimental ar-
rangements. Bohr says:
While, within the scope of classical physics, the
interaction between object and apparatus can
be neglected or, if necessary, compensated for,
in quantum physics this interaction thus forms
an inseparable part of the phenomenon. Ac-
cordingly, the unambiguous account of proper
quantum phenomena must, in principle, include
a description of all relevant features of the ex-
perimental arrangement. [34, p. 391]
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More specifically, Bohr argues that we should interpret
quantum mechanics as referring only to what obtains
within well-defined experimental arrangements:
It is certainly far more in accordance with the
structure and interpretation of the quantum me-
chanical symbolism, as well as with elementary
epistemological principles, to reserve the word
“phenomenon” for the comprehension of the
effects observed under given experimental con-
ditions. [33, p. 316]
What makes quantum mechanics an irreducibly proba-
bilistic theory is the fact that even after we have specified
as completely as possible what constitutes a repetition
of the same experiment, we typically find that the same
experiment yields different results. The next-to-last quo-
tation continues:
The very fact that repetition of the same experi-
ment, defined on the lines described, in general
yields different recordings pertaining to the ob-
ject, immediately implies that a comprehensive
account of experience in this field must be ex-
pressed by statistical laws.
And in the same essay, Bohr remarks about the quantum
formalism that
its physical interpretation finds expressions in
laws, of an essentially statistical type, pertain-
ing to observations obtained under given exper-
imental conditions. [34, p. 390]
It is but a short step to the conclusion that the reality
which the quantum theory describes is precisely the ten-
dencies or propensities of experimental arrangements to
produce results of a certain sort.
In his intellectual autobiography, Popper makes the
following claim about the reception of his propensity
interpretation:
I remember that the theory was not well re-
ceived to start with, which neither surprised nor
depressed me. Things have changed very much
since then, and some of the same critics (and
defenders of Bohr) who at first dismissed my
theory contemptuously as incompatible with
quantum mechanics now say that it is all old hat,
and in fact identical with Bohr’s view. [15, p.
180]
I want to make it clear that I am not claiming that Pop-
per’s interpretation of quantum mechanics is identical
with Bohr’s. There are interesting similarities, which
become especially evident when one discounts Popper’s
misreading of Bohr’s philosophy as a variety of subjec-
tivism. But equally significant are the differences, which
center around Bohr’s idea of complementarity, and derive
from a fundamental disagreement over the relationship
between different experimental arrangements. Popper’s si-
multaneous measurability thesis implies the compatibility
of all experimental arrangements. Bohr, on the other hand,
argues that the experimental arrangements necessary for
the measurement of pairs of conjugate parameters are
mutually exclusive, even though both parameters are, in
a sense, equally necessary for giving a complete account
of atomic objects. To be accurate, Popper effectively
concedes the exclusiveness of the experimental arrange-
ments for a certain kind of measurement of conjugate
parameters, namely, the kind he designates a “preparation
of state”. The passage of a beam of particles through a
narrow slit would be such a measurement, in as much as
it tells us something about the positions of the particles.
This kind of measurement corresponds to what was earlier
called a “predictive measurement” [1, p. 21]. The mutual
exclusiveness of experimental arrangements is what lies
at the root of complementarity, and thus it is also the
deep reason for Bohr’s denial of the simultaneous real-
ity of conjugate parameters. In Bohr’s opinion, it is the
novel, complementary relationship of quantum mechan-
ical phenomena that makes quantum mechanics unique
among physical theories, including other statistical the-
ories [9, 34]. If the propensity interpretation is detached
from the simultaneous definiteness thesis, it can become
the natural ally of the complementarity interpretation, and
one can hope that such an alliance would lead to deeper
insight into the implications of quantum mechanics.
Does Popper’s propensity interpretation accomplish
the original aims of his program in the philosophy of
quantum mechanics? In one sense, yes. It can lay claim
to being at least the basis for an objective interpretation,
and it can be argued that in taking propensities to be real
properties of experimental arrangements it constitutes a
kind of realistic interpretation. But let me conclude with
a cautionary note. When Popper claims to provide a re-
alistic interpretation of quantum mechanics, he is tacitly
asserting his allegiance with a long, continuing philosoph-
ical tradition, and though he never, to my knowledge,
explicitly mentions it, one important assumption of tradi-
tional realism is the mutual independence of observer and
observed. Yet precisely this assumption is put in question
by quantum mechanics. In Bohr’s words:
. . .the elucidation of the paradoxes of atomic
physics has disclosed the fact that the unavoid-
able interaction between the objects and the
measuring instruments sets an absolute limit
to the possibility of speaking of a behaviour
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of atomic objects which is independent of the
means of observation. [32, p. 25]
If one could assert the simultaneous definiteness of the
properties of interacting systems, then the independence
of observer and observed could be maintained, for they
could then each be assigned a separate state. So Popper’s
version of the propensity interpretation, incorporating the
definiteness thesis, qualifies as a realistic interpretation
in the traditional sense. But if definiteness is denied, as I
think it ought to be, and the holism of the orthodox quan-
tum mechanical description of interactions is accepted,
then it must be understood that, on its own, the propensity
interpretation’s place in the tradition is open to question.
Author’s Note
This paper was originally written in 1981 by invitation
for inclusion in a Popper Festschrift. But for reasons not
worth recalling now, it was not published in that volume.
It is presented here with only minimal editorial changes to
update some tenses, reflecting the fact of Popper’s since
having died and, in only one case, to call attention to one
of the author’s subsequent papers. These circumstances
explain the somewhat dated quality that some readers
might note.
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